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Abstract
In this study, we investigate the role of receptivity to novelty in innovation
and long-run economic growth. Consumers’ receptivity to novelty, as an individ-
ual propensity toward new goods, might be perceived to encourage innovation and
economic growth at the aggregate level unambiguously. Recent evidence, however,
suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship between average receptivity and macroe-
conomic performance in terms of innovation and growth; receptivity may not always
be good for the aggregate economy. To capture a mechanism behind this fact, we
develop a new R&D-based growth model with the understanding that innovation
consists of two separate activities of inventing new goods and introducing them
to the society. In our model, consumer receptivity encourages firms to invent but
discourages them from introducing. Interacted with population size and the elas-
ticity of substitution, these opposing forces generate a non-monotonic relationship.
While economies with moderate receptivity can achieve sustained innovation and
thereby long-run growth, those with too much or too little receptivity are likely to
be caught in an underdevelopment trap, in which innovations eventually fail. These
results suggest a theory that explains the inverted U.
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1 Introduction
It is generally believed that people’s receptivity to novelty or new ideas is important for
innovation. For example, Mokyr (1991) writes: “[T]he success of new techniques depends
both on the level of inventive activity and the receptivity of the surrounding economy to
new ideas.” More recently, Fagerberg (2005, 2013) argues that “‘openness’ to new ideas,
solutions, etc. is essential for innovation” because innovation requires people and firms
to “search widely for new ideas, inputs and sources of inspiration.” Since innovation is
widely recognized as a major driver for long-run growth, one may also think that the
public’s preferences for novelty are pivotal to economic growth and development.
The inspection of data, however, reveals a non-trivial relationship between the pub-
lic’s preferences for novelty and economic performance at the country level. Go¨ren (2017)
finds a stable inverted U-shaped relationship between novelty-seeking personality traits
and economic development.1 Novelty seeking is a widely-accepted psychological concept
that is defined as a human personality trait associated with “exhilaration or excitement
in response to novel stimuli” (Cloninger 1986), which naturally captures a crucial aspect
of people’s receptivity to novelty. In addition, surprisingly enough, we find that the re-
lationship between the public’s preferences for novelty and innovation itself may also
be inverted U-shaped. Figure 1 shows the country-level relationship between individual
receptivity to novelty and the number of patent applications per million capita.2 Re-
cent evidence, thus, suggests a non-monotonic relationship between the public desire for
novelty and such major macroeconomic variables.
What accounts for these seemingly counter-intuitive relationships? How do individu-
als’ preferences towards new ideas affect aggregate innovation and growth? These ques-
tions require a new framework where the effects of individuals’ preferences for novelty on
innovation and economic growth can be studied. By presenting such a new framework, the
present study offers a market-based explanation for the non-monotonic effects of recep-
tivity on the aggregate economy.3 To do this, we focus on “technological inertia” (Mokyr
1992) as a missing link. In the history of technological innovation, as Mokyr argues, most
societies have exhibited a strong resistance to innovation, experiencing technological sta-
sis. Therefore, new inventions often fail to be implemented or introduced into the society
despite their ostensible economic superiority; the introduction of a new invention is a
highly uncertain, difficult, and individual event (Mokyr 2000, 2004).4
We develop a new research and development (R&D)-based growth model a` la Romer
(1990), in which ideas are first invented as new goods and, eventually, become either
1Novelty-seeking traits are measured by the country-level genome data on DRD4 exon III allele fre-
quencies, which are “sometimes associated with the human personality trait of novelty-seeking behavior”
(Go¨ren 2017). As usual, economic development is measured by GDP per capita.
2We measure receptivity to novelty, based on the survey data, by whether the people in the country
consider that new ideas are better than old ones. The number of patent applications is a standard
measure of innovation. In Appendix A, we will provide a more formal regression analysis that confirms
the inverted-U relationship, together with further details about the data sources and variable definitions.
3This will complement Go¨ren (2017), who, in his simple model, hypothesizes (rather than explains) the
potential benefits and costs of novelty seeking traits for the level of public knowledge, with a reasonable
justification that is rigorously based on empirical evidence.
4A good example for this tendency is Crete’s Phaistos Disk in about 1700 B.C. (Diamond 1997), which
indicates the early invention of an efficient printing technique, but it received little social acceptance.
Being lost for a long time, printing technology was reinvented and widely introduced in Renaissance
Europe and, then, spread worldwide. Even for inventions that will eventually take root in society, the
path from invention to introduction is far from smooth; see Diamond (1997) for more examples.
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Figure 1: Receptivity and innovation: Cross-country relationship
Note: Innovation is measured by patent applications per million capita (log) and receptivity is
measured by World Values Survey’s question E046. The solid line is a fitted quadratic curve. The
dotted line is a Lowess smoothing curve.
matured to survive as long-lasting (or “old”) goods or obsolete. Whether a new invention
is ultimately introduced into the economy is uncertain, in accordance with the nature of
technological progress as mentioned above. A critical assumption is that the invention
(of new ideas as new goods) and the introduction (of new goods into old goods) are
separate innovative activities that both require investments. Their profitabilities are,
thus, governed by the consumers’ desire for newly-invented goods (or their “receptivity
to novelty”).
Using the model, we will offer an economic, market-based explanation for the non-
monotonic relationship between receptivity to novelty and macroeconomic performance.
In doing this, first, we identify two interactive factors generating the ambiguous effect of
receptivity on innovation: (a) the market mechanism, which encourages the development
of goods that earn a relatively large profit, and (b) a matching efficiency effect, which
enriches the “innovation-possibilities frontier” by agglomerating new inventions, which
are not innovation itself but the origin of “innovation” in the present context. These two
forces are complementary in the sense that, while the latter reduces the cost for innova-
tion, the former determines the distribution of resources to investments in inventing new
goods and saving them from obsolescence in each period of time. We will demonstrate
that the receptivity to novelty, together with the elasticity of substitution between goods,
plays an essential role in determining the balance between these two factors. As a result
of this, we will also show that consumer receptivity encourages firms to invent but dis-
courages them from introducing, which generate a non-monotonic relationship between
receptivity and innovation.
The core finding of this study is that only those economies with moderate receptivity
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to novelty can achieve self-sustained innovation and growth in the long run; when con-
sumers’ receptivity to novelty is too high or too low, their economy tends to be caught
in an “underdevelopment trap,” in which case new goods are invented over time but all
become obsolete along an equilibrium path, i.e., there is no innovation in the long run.5
The intuition behind our core finding is as follows: On the one hand, when consumers are
too averse to novelty, the demand for and profits related to newly-invented goods will be
relatively small so that almost no new goods are invented in the marketplace (through
the market mechanism). Since it shrinks the innovation-possibilities frontier, the cost
incurred by firms in introducing new goods into the society becomes higher (due to the
matching efficiency effect). In equilibrium, only invention occurs, but less actively; there
is no innovation in the long run.6 On the other hand, when consumers are too open to
novelty, the demand for and profits related to newly-invented goods are large, relative
to old goods. In such a scenario, invention is even more profitable than introduction
and there are more new goods to be invented in the marketplace (through the market
mechanism). Although abundant inventions imply a lower cost for innovation (due to
the matching efficiency effect), the economy is specialized in inventing new ideas on an
equilibrium path when consumers are highly open to novelty, yielding, once again, a lack
of innovation. Therefore, with too-low or too-high receptivity, the economy is caught in
an underdevelopment trap and has no innovation. In a trapped economy, there is no
economic growth in the long run.
We formally prove that only those economies with moderate receptivity to novelty
can achieve self-sustained innovation and growth in the long run. In this case, both
forces, as explained above, interact with each other, whereby the economy perpetually
fluctuates between periods where new goods are invented and periods where invented
goods are introduced escaping from obsolescence. Over the cycle, innovation persists,
but intermittently.7 In this case, the economy perpetually grows on an equilibrium path.
Therefore, we conclude that innovation and growth may be depressed by too-high or
too-low receptivity to novelty on the part of the representative consumer, suggesting a
theory that provides a useful basis for interpreting the observed inverted-U as mentioned
above.
Our theoretical finding also offers a market-based explanation on the observation
that, throughout history, invention and introduction have taken place cyclically (e.g.,
Mokyr 2000),8 by showing the existence of an innovation cycle over which invention and
introduction alternate along an equilibrium path. Therefore, we contribute to a large
theoretical literature that investigates the possibility of perpetually cyclical innovation
as an endogenous phenomenon (Shleifer 1986, Deneckere and Judd 1992, Gale 1996,
Francois and Shi 1999, Matsuyama 1999, 2001, Yano and Furukawa 2013, Furukawa
2015), to which our innovation cycle (between periods of invention and introduction)
is new. As is well known in this literature, an essential factor for innovation cycles is
the temporaty nature of monopoly power. We follow the literature when we assume the
one-period monopoly in a a discrete time model.
5Here, the trap can be regarded as a kind of low-level equilibrium trap (Nelson 1956) because, in the
present model, no innovation results in zero long-run growth in national income.
6Note that we assume that new goods rapidly become obsolete without introduction, while introduced
goods take root in the economy to contribute to long-run growth.
7In the baseline model, as explained here, an innovative economy is always perpetually cyclical. In
Section 5, however, we will show that it can also stably converge to a unique balanced growth path, by
considering a natural extension of the baseline model.
8See also footnote 4.
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In addition to receptivity to novelty, we focus on two other important factors that
interact with receptivity to affect innovation and growth. The first is gross substitutabil-
ity between goods. The mechanism through which the consumer’s receptivity affects
innovation is at work only when receptivity changes the expenditure share for newly in-
vented goods; it does not work if the elasticity of substitution between goods is equal to
1 (i.e., a Cobb–Douglas case). The second factor is country size. When a country has a
large population, the demand and profit for any firm are larger; this promotes all stages
in the innovation spectrum by making both invention and introduction activities more
profitable. Thus, larger-sized economies are more likely to achieve perpetual innovation.9
Our paper is closely related to a growing body of literature on culture and growth.
The seminal paper by Galor and Moav (2002) shows that individual preferences for off-
spring quality play a role in population growth and human capital formation.10 Among
subsequent studies, from a theoretical viewpoint, the most closely related ones are Galor
and Michalopoulos (2012) and Deopke and Zilibotti (2014). Both analyses identify the
critical role of entrepreneurial traits in innovation and economic growth by considering
an endogenous evolution of the fraction of people who exhibit an entrepreneurial spirit
(in terms of risk tolerance).11 They highlight a positive interplay between novelty-seeking
personal traits and economic growth at the country level. The present paper contributes
to this theoretical literature in the following two respects: (a) we focus on the consumer’s
preference for newly invented goods relative to old goods (receptivity) as another impor-
tant aspect of people’s novelty-seeking traits, and (b) we identify the potential benefits
and costs of receptivity for innovation and growth at the aggregate level.
From an empirical viewpoint, various studies have investigated the relationship be-
tween cultural factors and economic development. For example, Tabellini (2010) shows
that cultural propensities such as trust have a significant effect on regional per-capita
income in Europe. Alesina and Giuliano (2010) examine the effects of family ties on
economic performance.12 As we already mentioned, Go¨ren (2017) is closely related; he
uses molecular genetic data to find an inverted U-shaped relationship between some kind
of receptivity to novelty and economic development. The present paper complements
those papers by (a) providing new evidence suggesting that the country-level relationship
between individual receptivity and innovation is also inverted U-shaped and (b) offering
a new full-fledged R&D-based growth model that is equipped to explain the inverted-U
effects of receptivity on innovation and growth.
Our paper is also related to the literature on two-stage innovation models, which
distinguishes basic and applied research (see, e.g., Aghion and Howitt 1996, Michelacci
2003, Akiyama 2009, Cozzi and Galli 2009, 2013, 2014, Acs and Sanders 2012, Chu et al.
2012, Chu and Furukawa 2013, Konishi 2015). Noting that the two separate activities
9As discussed later (after Lemma 4), this is in line with Boserup’s (1965) view. See Kremer (1993)
for a more recent study.
10Subsequent studies by Ashraf and Galor (2007, 2013a, 2013b, 2017) explore cultural/genetic diversity
and regional development at different stages and in different places.
11See also Chu (2007), who provides the interesting argument that entrepreneurial overconfidence can
cause different rates of economic growth across countries. Moreover, Chu and Cozzi (2011) focuses on
cultural preferences for fertility. In a broader context, as Yano (2009) points out, the coordination of
such cultural factors with laws and rules is indispensable to deriving high quality markets and thereby
healthy economic growth. The present study extends this literature by investigating a composition effect
of receptivity to novelty, patent protection, and population on long-run economic growth.
12See also Benabou et al. (2015, 2016), who show that innovation can be negatively associated with
people’s religiosity.
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of innovation in our model both earn profits, our study complements this literature by
exploring two different processes of applied research, i.e., the invention of a new product
and its introduction.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a new R&D-
based growth model that incorporates invention and introduction as separate innovative
activities and derives equilibrium conditions. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium
dynamics of the model. Section 4 identifies the critical role of receptivity in innovation
and growth in the long run. Section 5 provides an extension of the baseline model,
showing that our economy can also experience dynamic phenomena such as balanced
growth and history dependence, in addition to underdevelopment traps and innovation.
Finally, Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2 An R&D-based Growth Model of Invention and
Introduction
Time is discrete and extends from 0 to ∞. We think of an R&D-based growth model
with expanding varieties a` la Romer (1990). We extend the standard variety-expansion
model (a) by considering that innovation consists of two separate activities of inventing
new goods and introducing them to the economy (based on the historical argument of
Mokyr (2004)), (b) by parameterizing consumer receptivity to newly invented goods
(in order to explore the role of individual receptivity in aggregate innovation), and (c)
by considering the temporary nature of monopoly (that follows the innovation cycle
literature (Shleifer 1986)). In summary, consumer receptivity encourages firms to invent
new goods in equilibrium but discourages them from introduce. These two opposite
effects of receptivity can generate a non-monotonic relationship between receptivity and
innovation in the long-run equilibrium and also cause perpetual cycles on an equilibrium
transitional path.
2.1 Consumption and Receptivity
In the economy, there is an infinitely lived representative consumer, who inelastically
supplies L units of labor in each period. The infinitely lived consumer solves the standard
dynamic optimization of consumption and saving:
maxU =
∞∑
t=0
βt lnu(t), (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the time preference rate and u(t) is an index of consumption in period
t. Since our focus is on consumers’ receptivity, we follow Grossman and Helpman (1991)
by assuming that periodic utility u is defined over differentiated consumption goods, with
each indexed by j.13 As is standard in the literature, we consider a constant elasticity of
13In this class of the R&D-based growth model, the variety of consumption goods endogenously in-
creases over time, unlike in the original Romer model (in which the variety of intermediate goods in-
creases). Therefore, in the present model, patents are granted for consumption goods, but they are often
for intermediate goods in reality. Nevertheless, we adopt the present setting because we are interested in
consumers’ receptivity to novelty. Note, however, that we can obtain similar results even if we consider
an expanding variety of intermediate goods.
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substitution utility function as:
u(t) =
(∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
(ε(j, t) x(j, t))
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
, (2)
where x(j, t) denotes the consumption of good j in period t and σ ≥ 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between any two consumption goods. The consumption goods are catego-
rized into two types: new goods and old goods. Let N(t) be the set of new goods invented
in period t and A(t) be the set of old goods. An old good is a fundamental good that
is fully introduced and takes root in the economy, so that it does not become obsolete.
For simplicity of the description, let A(t) or N(t) also denote the number (measure) of
goods.
A new good is a newly invented design of a good, which is “fragile” in the following
sense. Unlike an old good, a new good may be only transient and, thus, become obsolete
after being consumed for one period. Consumers differentiate new and old goods because
they are endowed with not only a love of variety, but also a love of novelty, so to speak.
We incorporate such references to novelty into the model, by means of a weight function,
ε(j, t), which is specified as
ε(j, t) =
{
1 if j ∈ A(t) (old goods)
ε if j ∈ N(t) (new goods) . (3)
In (3), the old goods are weighted with ε(j, t) = 1 (normalization), while the new goods
are weighted with ε(j, t) = ε ≥ 0.14 We interpret the weight of new goods ε as a measure
of how open consumers are to newly invented products. We refer to ε as the consumer’s
receptivity to novelty. If consumers have no receptivity to novelty whatsoever (or, a
complete aversion to novelty), it holds that ε = 0, in which case they do not exhibit any
preference with regard to new goods. Consumers with receptivity to novelty (i.e., with
ε > 0) will feel some utility for new goods. In line with Go¨ren (2017), we may also refer
to this preference parameter ε as capturing a consumer’s degree of “novelty seeking.”
As we already explained, novelty seeking is a widely-accepted psychological concept that
is defined as a human personality trait associated with “exhilaration or excitement in
response to novel stimuli” (Cloninger 1986). Since consumers in different cultures can
have different degrees of novelty seeking on average (Chandrasekaran and Tellis 2008,
Tellis et al. 2009), we may consider ε as an intrinsic parameter on the preference that
historically and culturally characterizes a society.15
Each good j, a new or old good, is dominated by a monopolistic producer. We consider
a one-for-one technology in goods production. Namely, any producer, j ∈ A(t) or N(t),
hires x(j, t) units of labor to produce x(j, t) units of good j, and monopolistically sells
them to the consumer.
2.2 Innovation through Invention and Introduction
We extend the endogenous process of innovation a` la Romer (1990) by considering that
a newly invented good will become obsolete or survive to be introduced into the society
14One may think it is more natural to assume ε < 1. In some cases, however, people can show an
unusually strong affinity for new goods (relative to old goods), so we allow for ε to be higher than 1
although it does not change our results essentially.
15The view that the degree of novelty seeking, or receptivity to novelty, varies has also been considered
in consumer research (Hirschman 1980) and business (Rogers 1962, Rogers and Shoemaker 1971).
7
as an old good; in this process, both invention and introduction are endogenous activities
that require time and resources.
A potentially infinite number of firms can be involved in the innovation process. Any
firm can invent a new good in period t + 1 by making an investment of 1/A(t) units of
labor in period t. Following Romer (1990), we consider “external effects arising from
knowledge spillovers” of cumulative technologies, represented by A(t).16
An old good is, in contrast, an introduced good that takes root in the society and
is never obsolete, from which an economy will permanently have utility. In our view,
transforming a new good into such a well-established good is concerned with compelling
consumers to be knowledgeable of and fully accept it. Investment in introduction, thus,
covers various activities, including marketing, advertising, and lobbying, as well as some
technical improvements.
Analogous to invention firms, a potentially infinite number of firms can be engaged in
introduction activities. A firm, first, invests one unit of labor to search through the set
of new goods, N(t), in period t; then, it can find χ(t) units of new goods from N(t), and
introduce this these new goods into the society in period t+1, thus, earning monopolistic
profits. In this process, new goods are transformed into old goods. We consider a linear
technology, χ(t) ≡ κN(t), in which κ > 0 is a productivity parameter.17 With this
function, we naturally assume that firms can find more new goods when there are more
new goods in the economy. When introduction happens, we say that the economy brings
about innovation, by which we mean the entire process in which new goods are invented
and, then, introduced to take root in society (as old goods).
The law of motion governing the growth of old goods, A(t), is given by
A(t+ 1)− A(t) = χ(t)RA(t) ≤ N(t), (4)
in which RA(t) denotes the number of firms that invest in introduction activities in
period t. None of old goods becomes obsolete since they fully take root in the economy.18
Meanwhile, we assume that the new goods that are not introduced become obsolete. We,
thus, express the evolution of N(t) as:
N(t+ 1) = RN(t), (5)
where RN(t) denotes the number of firms that invest in invention activities in period t.
Here, a macroeconomic rate at which new goods are accepted as old goods in society
from period t to t+ 1 is equal to
χ(t)RA(t)/N(t) ≡ ρ(t+ 1). (6)
Unlike consumer receptivity ε as a preference parameter, one may interpret ρ(t + 1) as
an equilibrium rate of receptivity at the aggregate level.
16We suppose that there is no spillover from newly invented goods, since they are so new that their
information would not be diffused well. Nevertheless, even if we allow for new goods N(t) in public
knowledge, the main results will not qualitatively change.
17From a broader perspective, this κ can relate to firms’ absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal
1989).
18We could allow for some small depreciation for A(t), without rendering any essential change to the
result.
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2.3 Market Equilibrium
The infinitely lived consumer solves static optimization in (1); as is well known, we have
the demand functions:
x(j, t) = ε(j, t)σ−1
E(t)p(j, t)−σ
P (t)1−σ
, (7)
where E(t) ≡ ∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t) p(j, t)x(j, t)dj is the spending on differentiated goods, p(j, t)
denotes the price of good j in period t, and P (t) is the usual price index, defined as:
P (t) ≡
(∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
(p(j, t)/ε(j, t))1−σdj
) 1
1−σ
. (8)
Solving dynamic optimization, we also obtain the Euler equation:
E(t+ 1)
E(t)
= β(1 + r(t)), (9)
where r(t) stands for the interest rate.
We assume that producing one unit of goods requires one unit of labor and, thus, the
marginal cost is equal to the wage rate, w(t). By (7), the consumption good producers,
j ∈ A(t) ∪ N(t), face a constant price elasticity of market demand, equal to σ ≥ 1.
The unconstrained mark-up for a monopolistic producer is σ/(σ − 1) > 1. To allow for a
Cobb-Douglas case with σ = 1, we follow Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), and Iwaisako
and Futagami (2013) and introduce an upper bound of the mark-up—say, µ > 1—by
considering potential imitators whose production cost increases with so-called patent
breadth.19 The breadth of a patent is identified with “the flow rate of profit available to
the patentee” and often interpreted as “the ability of the patentee to raise price” (Gilbert
and Shapiro 1990). Following the literature, we regard µ as the breadth of a patent and
assume µ < σ/(σ − 1).20 Each firm, thus, sets a monopolistic price at:
p(j, t) = µw(t) (10)
for all j. Using (3), (7), and (10), the output and monopolistic profit for a new good are
given by:
x(j, t) =
εσ−1E(t)
P (t)1−σ
(µw(t))−σ ≡ xn(t) for j ∈ N(t) (11)
and
pi(j, t) = εσ−1
µ− 1
µσ
E(t)
(
w(t)
P (t)
)1−σ
≡ pin(t) for j ∈ N(t). (12)
Equation (12) shows that when σ > 1, the profit for a new good, pin(t), increases with
consumer receptivity, ε, and the total expenditure, E(t), and decreases with the real
wage, w(t)/P (t).21
We follow Shleifer (1986), Deneckere and Judd (1992), Gale (1996), Francois and Shi
(1999), Matsuyama (1999, 2001), and Furukawa (2015) by assuming that the monopolistic
firm earns a profit only for one period. The one-period monopoly has also been used in a
different context (e.g., in the field of directed technical change and the environment) (see
19See, for example, Chu et al. (2016) for a more recent examination.
20The upper bound of a mark-up, µ, can also be seen as a result of price regulation (Evans et al. 2003).
21We will also see the case of σ = 1.
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Acemoglu et al. 2012). Therefore, the firm inventing good j enjoys only a one-period
monopoly. The discounted present value of creating a new good can be written as:
W n(t) ≡ pi
n(t+ 1)
1 + r(t)
− w(t)
A(t)
. (13)
We also follow Acemoglu et al. (2012) by assuming that, after one period, monopoly
rights will, then, be allocated randomly to a firm drawn from the pool of potential mo-
nopolistic firms. Consequently, in our model, goods are all monopolistically competitively
produced in equilibrium. Alternatively, we could also proceed in such a way that goods
with expired patents are sold at a perfectly competitive price (e.g., Matsuyama 1999)
or become obsolete (e.g., Furukawa 2015). However, we understand that either option
will complicate the analysis without garnering any new insights. Although it could be
an interesting extension, we keep the analysis as simple as possible to highlight the main
issue discussed in the Introduction.
Analogous to the case of a new good, j ∈ N(t), by (3), (7), and (10), the output and
monopolistic profit for an old good are given by:
x(j, t) =
E(t)
P (t)1−σ
(µw(t))−σ ≡ xa(t) for j ∈ A(t) (14)
and
pi(j, t) =
µ− 1
µσ
E(t)
(
w(t)
P (t)
)1−σ
≡ pia(t) for j ∈ A(t), (15)
respectively. The profit associated with an old good increases with the expenditure, E(t),
and decreases with the real wage, w(t)/P (t). Given the one-period patent protection, the
discounted present value of introducing an old good is expressed as
W a(t) ≡ (κN(t))pi
a(t+ 1)
1 + r(t)
− w(t). (16)
As shown in (12) and (15), the real wage w(t)/P (t) is an important component of the
profits. It is, thus, beneficial to have
w(t)
P (t)
=
1
µ
[
A(t) + εσ−1N(t)
] 1
σ−1 , (17)
which uses p(j, t) = µw(t) for any j ∈ A(t) ∪N(t) with (8).
Under the free entry of firms into innovation, the present value of their payoff must
be equal to or less than 0:
W n(t) ≤ 0 and W a(t) ≤ 0, (18)
for any t ≥ 0. The labor market clearing condition is:
L =
∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
x(j, t)dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
production
+ RA(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
introduction
+
RN(t)
A(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
invention
, (19)
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where χ(t)RA(t)/N(t) ≡ ρ(t + 1). Using (11), (14), (17), and (19),22 the labor demand
from the production sector is calculated as∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
x(j, t)dj =
1
µ
E(t)
w(t)
. (20)
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
We are now ready to derive the dynamical system that characterizes the law of motion
that determines the equilibrium trajectory of the economy. In doing this, it is beneficial
to define n(t) ≡ N(t)/A(t), which is the ratio of new to old goods. The equilibrium
dynamics can be completely characterized by means of this knowledge ratio. By the free
entry conditions in (18), along with (12), (13), (15), and (16), we derive the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 Only the invention of a new good takes place in equilibrium when n(t) <
εσ−1/κ. Only the introduction of a new good takes place when n(t) > εσ−1/κ.
The cut-off level of n(t), εσ−1/κ, generates two equilibrium regimes in the economy.
The first corresponds to n(t) ∈ (0, εσ−1/κ), which we call an invention regime; there,
only invention takes place. The second corresponds to n(t) ∈ (εσ−1/κ,∞), which we
call an introduction regime; there, only introduction takes place. At the cut-off point,
the economy includes both activities; however, we can ignore it, since the point has zero
measure.
As shown in Lemma 1, a kind of specialization takes place in the present model. In
reality, any economy appears to be engaged in both invention and introduction, more
or less, at any point in time. Therefore, this model captures only a certain aspect of
real-world behavior—that is, the economy invests in either invention or introduction. We
can easily remove this unrealistic aspect concerning specialization from the model by
assuming, for instance, a strictly concave function in invention and introduction. As this
would provide a deeper analysis but make the analysis intractable, we adopt the present
setting for simplicity, given that it is among the first to address the relationship between
receptivity to novelty and innovation.
As discussed in the Introduction, there are two interactive forces determining the
role of consumer receptivity to novelty ε in innovation, that is, the market mechanism
and the matching effect. Lemma 1 reveals the first force. To elaborate this, we will
temporarily restrict ourselves to short-run equilibrium, by focusing on one particular
period, say t. Note that in each period, t, the value of n(t) is supposed to be given,
since it is a pre-determined (stock) variable (that actually changes over time). In the
hypothetical situation in which n(t) is taken as given, Lemma 1 implies that, for a given
n(t), an economy is engaged in invention activity in equilibrium if (and only if) the
invention regime, (0, εσ−1/κ), is sufficiently large (relative to n(t)). Since the consumer’s
desire for new goods, relative to old goods, becomes stronger as ε increases, and since the
cost for introduction becomes higher as κ decreases, there is a higher relative profit for
22Noting (11) and (14), with (17), we have∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
x(j, t)dj = N(t)xn(t) +A(t)xa(t) =
1
µ
E(t)
w(t)
.
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the invention of a new good when the individual receptivity to novelty ε is high and/or
the productivity for introduction κ is low. Consequently, the economy is more likely to
specialize in invention activity for new goods, because the development of technologies
that earn a higher profit is encouraged in market equilibrium. For the same reason, an
economy is engaged in introduction activity in the short-run equilibrium when εσ−1/κ is
small, relative to n(t), in which case there is a higher relative profit for the introduction
of a new good. In sum, through the market mechanism, the economy develops new
technologies to produce the goods that the consumer relatively prefers, whereby the
receptivity to novelty ε plays a role in strengthening invention, rather than introduction.
3.1 Invention Regime
With n(t) < εσ−1/κ, by Lemma 1, the economy falls into the invention regime. With (9),
(13), (12), and (17), the free entry condition for invention, W n(t) = 0, becomes:
N(t+ 1) =
A(t)
εσ−1
[
βεσ−1
µ/(µ− 1)
E(t)
w(t)
− 1
]
, (21)
which uses A(t + 1) = A(t) (or ρ(t + 1) = 0). Given A(t), this describes a profit-
motive aspect of the inventive activity; the larger the discounted profit from selling new
goods ((βεσ−1(µ − 1)/µ)E(t)/w(t)), the greater the incentives for firms to invent a new
good. The profit for a new good increases as the wage-adjusted expenditure E(t)/w(t)
increases and, at the same time, as the consumer’s receptivity to novelty ε increases.
With a larger stock of public knowledge, the cost of inventing a new good decreases and
firms have greater incentives for invention. Meanwhile, when n(t) < εσ−1/κ, no firm has
any incentive to invest in introducing a new good; in such a case, RA(t) = 0. The labor
market condition (19), thus, becomes:
N(t+ 1) = A(t)
[
L− 1
µ
E(t)
w(t)
]
, (22)
which uses (5) and (20). GivenA(t), the greater the wage-adjusted expenditure E(t)/w(t),
the more resources will be devoted to production, leaving less for invention; this will result
in a smaller N(t+ 1).
Figure 2 depicts (21) and (22), labeled with FE and LE, respectively, which deter-
mine the equilibrium number of new goods, N(t+1), and the wage-adjusted expenditure,
E(t)/w(t), as a unique intersection. Looking at this figure, we can see that some stan-
dard properties hold in the present model. Given the predetermined variable, A(t), the
equilibrium number of new goods N(t+1) is increasing in the time preference rate β, the
labor force L, and the patent breadth µ. Given these parameters, the invented goods,
N(t+ 1), is increasing in public knowledge stock A(t).
The effect of the elasticity of substitution between goods, σ, is more interesting. As
is standard, σ determines the expenditure share spent on each good. If new goods are
preferable to old goods (ε > 1), a higher elasticity of substitution would lead to a higher
expenditure share for the new good, resulting in an upward shift of the FE curve in
Figure 2. If old goods are preferable (ε < 1), there would be a lower expenditure share
for the new good, resulting in a downward shift of the FE curve. When σ = 1 (i.e., the
case of a Cobb–Douglas preference), any expenditure share is always constant and free
from receptivity to novelty ε. As a result, the new good N(t+1) is increasing (decreasing)
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Figure 2: Temporary Equilibrium in the Invention Regime
in the elasticity of substitution σ in an economy with a strong (weak) preference for the
new good ε > 1 (ε < 1).
As for the receptivity to novelty ε, a higher ε causes an upward shift in the FE curve.
This is simply because the equilibrium profit for new goods, (βεσ−1(µ−1)/µ)E(t)/w(t), is
higher.23 The upward shift of the FE curve leads to an increase in N(t+1) in equilibrium.
We can formally confirm this effect of ε by solving (21) and (22):
N(t+ 1) = ΘA(t), (23)
where
Θ ≡ ε
σ−1(µ− 1)L− 1/β
εσ−1 ((µ− 1) + 1/β) . (24)
Equation (23) determines the equilibrium amount of new goods in the invention regime.
The coefficient Θ is increasing in the receptivity to novelty ε as well as the standard
parameters β, L, and µ. We can interpret the parameter composite Θ as the potential
demand for new goods. We assume Θ > 0 to allow for positive growth, by imposing
εσ−1β(µ − 1)L > 1, which provides a lower bound of ε as [1/(β(µ − 1)L)]1/(σ−1) ≡ ε0.
Meanwhile, since RA(t) = 0 and thus ρ(t + 1) = 0 in the invention regime, from (4),
the old goods do not grow; A(t + 1) = A(t). Therefore, if Θ > εσ−1/κ, it holds that
n(t + 1) > εσ−1/κ, whereby the economy moves to the introduction regime in period
t+ 1. Conversely, if Θ < εσ−1/κ, the economy is trapped to stay in the invention regime.
We may refer to this situation as an invention trap, since there is neither innovation nor
growth in the long run (as will be apparent later). While this economy invents new goods
every period, both N(t) and A(t) are ever constant in the invention trap. The following
lemma summarizes this feature:
23See also (12).
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Lemma 2 The economy is permanently trapped in the invention regime if and only if
Θ < εσ−1/κ.
Inspection of (23) and (24) reveals the second force determining the role of consumer
receptivity ε, that is, the matching effect. From (23), the equilibrium amount of new
goods is larger as the invention potential Θ is larger and the old goods A(t) are larger.
Given that stronger preferences for new goods increase their potential demand (i.e., Θ
increases with ε), the consumer receptivity to novelty ε is conducive to inventions. That
is, higher ε yields more new goods to be invented in the marketplace, which essentially
increases the efficiency of matching for firms. Firms can find more new goods that
they will introduce in the subsequent period. As a result, it encourages aggregate-level
innovation in our model.
3.2 Introduction Regime
With n(t) > εσ−1/κ, by Lemma 1, the economy is in the introduction regime in period t;
RA(t) ≥ 0 and RN(t) = 0. Rearranging the labor market condition (19), with (20), yields
the economy’s equilibrium rate of receptivity as:
ρ(t+ 1) = κRA(t) = κ
(
L− 1
µ
E(t)
w(t)
)
. (25)
Analogous to (22), (25) captures the trade-off on resources between the production of
goods and the investment in introduction. With (9), (15), and (16), the free entry
condition for introduction, W a(t) = 0, becomes:
ρ(t+ 1) =
κβ
µ/(µ− 1)
E(t)
w(t)
− A(t)
N(t)
(26)
which uses N(t+1) = RN(t) = 0 from (5), with χ(t)RA(t) = ρ(t+1)N(t), and A(t+1) =
A(t)+χ(t)RA(t) = A(t)+χ(t)ρ(t+1)/κ from (4). Naturally, the equilibrium rate ρ(t+1)
of receptivity at the aggregate level increases with the discounted profit from producing
the old good (β(µ − 1)/µ)E(t)/w(t). In addition, ρ(t + 1) decreases with the number
of old goods A(t), since the profit is lower when the economy has sufficient old goods
(due to diminishing marginal utility in (2)). It increases with the number of new goods
N(t), since firms can find more inventions. Figure 3 illustrates how the equilibrium rate
of receptivity ρ(t+ 1) is determined by (25) and (26). Solving (25) and (26), we obtain:24
ρ(t+ 1) =
1
1 + β (µ− 1)
(
κβ (µ− 1)L− A(t)
N(t)
)
. (27)
The equilibrium rate of receptivity, ρ(t+ 1), is positively (negatively) correlated with
new good N(t) (the old good A(t)), through the free entry condition (26). Using (4) and
(27), the growth of old goods follows
A(t+ 1) = A(t)
β (µ− 1)
1 + β (µ− 1)
(
1 + κL
N(t)
A(t)
)
(28)
24Note that ρ(t + 1) > 0 always holds, with the positive growth assumption, εσ−1β(µ − 1)L > 1. In
order to retain feasibility, we have to ensure that ρ(t + 1) < 1, or equivalently χ(t)RA(t) ≤ N(t), holds
entirely in the introduction regime. We do this by imposing κL < 1 + 1/(β (µ− 1)).
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Figure 3: Temporary Equilibrium in the Introduction Regime
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In the present regime, the new goods do not grow; N(t + 1) = 0 from (5). This implies
n(t+ 1) = 0, which is clearly lower than εσ−1/κ. We therefore have the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The introduction regime is unstable; the economy in the introduction regime
necessarily shifts to the invention regime.
4 Invention Traps and Innovation Cycles
In this section, we will demonstrate our main result. An economy with too strong or too
weak receptivity to novelty is caught in an underdevelopment trap in which new goods
are constantly invented but any of them is introduced as old goods; there is no innovation.
Only with moderate receptivity can the economy achieve perpetual innovation.
4.1 A Benchmark
Before proceeding, we, first, present a special case with a unit elasticity of substitution
between goods. With σ = 1, the condition in Lemma 2 becomes:
β(µ− 1)L− 1
β (µ− 1) + 1 <
1
κ
. (29)
Independent of the consumer receptivity ε, this inequality always holds, due to the fea-
sibility condition (see footnote 24). This case, therefore, provides us with a convenient
benchmark from which we depart in identifying the role of the consumer’s preference for
new inventions, ε, in innovation and growth.
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By Lemmata 2 and 3, the benchmark economy is necessarily caught in the trap; any
path starting from any initial point, in either regime, eventually stays in the invention
regime. As we have already seen, such an economy invents new goods every period, but
any of them become simply obsolete, not transformed into old goods. The consumer’s
receptivity to novelty ε plays no role; this is because, in the present case, the preference
parameter ε does not affect demands and profits, as σ = 1 (i.e., the expenditure share of
the consumer for new goods, to old goods, is constant with the Cobb–Douglas preference).
Remark 1 The consumer’s receptivity to novelty ε has no role in equilibrium if the con-
sumption goods are independent goods (i.e., σ = 1). In this benchmark case, independent
of ε, the economy is fatally caught in the equilibrium trap, in which there is no innovation
in the long run.
Remark 1 implies that without a role of receptivity ε, our economy cannot achieve
innovation and growth in the long run. In what follows, we will relax the knife-edge
assumption σ = 1 to demonstrate the possibility of receptivity-driven innovation and
derive a condition under which it actually occurs in equilibrium.
4.2 The Role of Receptivity in Innovation
In this section, we depart from the benchmark to characterize the essential role of recep-
tivity ε in innovation, by assuming substitutability, that is, σ > 1. First, let us consider
the case where Θ < εσ−1/κ. In other words, the economy’s inventive potential Θ is rel-
atively low and, at the same time, the consumer’s receptivity to novelty ε is relatively
high. On the one hand, the invention regime is larger due to a high ε. On the other
hand, the invention flow N(t) within the regime tends to be low, due to a low Θ. As
shown in Lemma 2, the economy behaves as if in the benchmark case, fatally caught in
an equilibrium trap with no innovation.
Given that the invention potential Θ is an increasing function in ε, there will be a
mixed role of ε, under the assumption of σ > 1. If the receptivity to novelty ε is high,
on the one hand, the consumer will prefer new goods to old goods. With this effect, the
invention of new goods becomes more profitable than does the introduction of new goods,
as old ones, and, thus, the invention regime (0, εσ−1/κ) will become large, through the
market mechanism. This will make the economy more likely to get caught in what we call
the invention trap. On the other hand, a higher ε results in a higher Θ. This means that
the potential demand for new goods Θ is large. This increase in Θ is accompanied by an
increase in the equilibrium number of new goods N(t). Firms can meet more new goods
that are available for introduction. With this effect of ε through the matching effect,
the left-hand side of Θ < εσ−1/κ increases, and the economy is less likely to be trapped.
These two opposite effects interact to create an ambiguous role for the receptivity to
novelty ε. To see which effect dominates, we present the following lemma, recalling the
lower bound of ε, ε > ε0 ≡ [1/(β(µ− 1)L)]1/(σ−1) .
Lemma 4 If
L < 2
√
1
κ
(
1 +
1
β (µ− 1)
)
1
β (µ− 1) ≡ L0, (30)
Θ < εσ−1/κ holds for any ε > ε0. Otherwise, there exists ε+ ≥ ε− > ε0, such that
Θ < εσ−1/κ holds if (and only if) ε 6∈ [ε−, ε+].
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Proof. Rewriting Θ < εσ−1/κ, we obtain
F (εσ−1) ≡ 1
κ
(
1 +
1
β (µ− 1)
)(
εσ−1
)2 − Lεσ−1 + 1
β (µ− 1) > 0, (31)
which is a second-order polynomial inequality in terms of εσ−1. Since the leading coeffi-
cient is positive, this inequality is always true if the discriminant is negative; that is to
say:
D := L2 − 4/κ
β (µ− 1)
(
1 +
1
β (µ− 1)
)
< 0,
which is equivalent to (30). For D ≥ 0, let
εσ−1− =
L−√D
(2/κ)(1 + 1/(β(σ − 1))) , ε
µ−1
+ =
L+
√
D
(2/κ)(1 + 1/(β(µ− 1))) . (32)
For any εσ−1 between εσ−1− and ε
σ−1
+ or at one of them, the left-hand side of (31),
that is, F (εσ−1), is nonpositive, and otherwise it is positive. Finally, to show ε− >
ε0, let us suppose ε
σ−1
0 ≥ εσ−1− ; then, εσ−10 > εσ−1+ must hold, because F (εσ−10 ) =
(β(µ − 1)/κ) (1 + 1/(β(µ− 1))) (1/(βL(µ− 1)))2 is strictly positive.25 Taking, for in-
stance, εσ−1 = εσ−11 ≡ 2/(βL(µ − 1)) > εσ−10 , F (εσ−11 ) > 0 must also hold, since
εσ−11 > ε
σ−1
0 > ε
σ−1
+ . However, by substituting ε
σ−1 = εσ−11 into (31), we verify that
F (εσ−11 ) > 0 can hold only for D < 0, which contradicts D ≥ 0.
Lemma 4 implies that the economy will become fatally trapped in the invention regime
if the country size, L, is too small; this clarifies an essential role of the so-called scale
effect within the model. While the existence of the scale effect has been empirically
rejected from a long-run perspective, by using 100 years of data (Jones 1995), it might
play a role in world development in the very long run, such as in terms of millennia: As
Boserup (1965) argues, population growth often triggers the adoption of new technology,
since people are forced to adopt new technology when their population becomes too large
to be supported by existing technology. The empirical finding of Kremer (1993) also
suggests that total research output increases with population.26 Consistent with these
views, Lemma 4 shows that population size affects innovation and growth in the long run.
The threshold level of L in (30), L0, comprises several parameters. Since, for instance, L0
decreases with κ, the productivity of firms has a role in avoiding traps, which is natural
and intuitive. In the remainder of this paper, to focus on receptivity ε, we restrict our
analyses to the case with L ≥ L0.
Another important implication of Lemma 4 is that only an economy with moderate
receptivity to novelty ε, such as ε ∈ [ε−, ε+], can avoid falling into traps. In other words,
if consumers’ preferences for new goods are too strong or weak, the economy can be
caught in an invention trap. That is, ε /∈ [ε−, ε+] is the trap condition. This nonlinear
effect comes from the interaction between the two opposite roles of ε. When the consumer
hardly appreciates new goods, and there is, therefore, a very low ε, the potential demand
for new goods Θ is also too small for firms to find an enough amount of new goods,
χ(t)N(t). When the consumer very much appreciates new goods, with a very high ε,
the investment in invention is very profitable, making the threshold εσ−1/κ much higher.
25Potentially, because of F (ε0) > 0, either min{ε−, ε+} > ε0 or max{ε−, ε+} < ε0 necessarily holds,
given that the leading coefficient of F (εσ−1) is positive.
26According to Kuznets (1960) and Simon (1977), a higher population means more potential investors.
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With this high εσ−1/κ, the economy can scarcely emerge from such a large invention
regime. These two forces interact with each other to create the nonlinear effect of ε.
Proposition 1 (Extreme Receptivity Causes Innovation to Fail Eventually)
When the infinitely lived consumer’s receptivity to novelty ε is sufficiently low or high,
such that ε /∈ [ε−, ε+], there is a globally stable equilibrium trap, n∗. The economy neces-
sarily converges to the situation in which invention occurs, but there is no innovation in
the long run.
Proof. It is straightforward from Lemmata 1–4.
Proposition 1 implies that not only the “fear of novelty” (Beveridge 1959, Barber
1961), but also love of novelty may cause an economy to fall into a no-innovation trap.
Together with Remark 1, this critical effect of consumer receptivity to novelty ε appears
only when consumption goods are gross substitutes. Intuitively, given that new and
old goods are substitutes (σ > 1), a consumer with a weak preference for new goods
(low ε) and who suffers from a fear of novelty will have a small demand for new goods,
which are the origins of old goods. This effect discourages the efficiency of matching for
introduction, causing the economy to be more likely to be caught in the invention regime.
Meanwhile, there is another relative effect of low ε, where inventing a new good becomes
less profitable than does introducing new goods; such circumstances would shrink the
invention regime itself (i.e., a lower threshold εσ−1/κ). This causes the economy to be
less likely to be caught in the invention regime. As shown in Proposition 1, these two
opposite effects—each emerging with the market mechanism and the matching effect—
interact with each other to generate the nonlinear effect of the receptivity to novelty ε.
On the one hand, if preferences for new goods ε are sufficiently weak, our result shows
that the former absolute effect dominates—that is, the invention of new goods (N(t))
is too slow to exceed the threshold, εσ−1/κ. On the other hand, if a consumer has a
strong preference for new goods (high ε), with a love of novelty, the latter relative effect
dominates. The invention N(t) is rapid due to the former effect, but the invention regime,
(0, εσ−1/κ), is large due to the latter effect. As in the case of a small ε, therefore, the
economy tends to be trapped in the invention regime. Consequently, both too much fear
and too much love of novelty can generate a stable underdevelopment trap in equilibrium.
What if the receptivity to novelty ε were moderate, such that Θ > εσ−1/κ holds? In
this case, any equilibrium path achieves self-sustained innovation perpetually. By Lemma
2, an economy that falls in the invention regime in some period, say t, will go out of it
to the introduction regime in the subsequent period, t + 1. By Lemma 3, any economy
in the introduction regime necessarily moves to the invention regime. Any path starting
from anywhere (in either regime) perpetually fluctuates, moving back and forth between
the two regimes. We may interpret this equilibrium path as an innovation cycle, in the
sense that innovation takes place only in the introduction regime.
We summarize this finding as a proposition.
Proposition 2 (Moderate Receptivity Supports Perpetual Innovation) When
the infinitely lived consumer’s receptivity to novelty ε is moderate, such that ε ∈ [ε−, ε+],
the economy necessarily avoids traps and achieves perpetual innovation.
Proof. It is straightforward from Lemmata 1–4.
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As mentioned in the Introduction, our innovation cycle is new to the literature
(Shleifer 1986), in the sense that, in our model, innovation covers the entire process
in which new goods are invented and, then, introduced to take root in the economy (as
old goods). Note that both invention and introduction are endogenous, time-consuming,
and costly activities. Our result contributes to the literature on innovation cycles by
showing the existence of a new innovation cycle over which invention and introduction
endogenously alternate along an equilibrium path. This cycle is consistent with some
historical facts argued in Mokyr (2000) and his related articles, indicating that invention
and introduction typically take place at different times.
In Propositions 1 and 2, we demonstrate that an economy with too much receptivity
or aversion to novelty becomes caught in an underdevelopment trap, where there is only
invention, and no innovation takes place. Only an economy with moderate receptivity to
novelty ε can achieve self-sustained innovation.
In order to see the effects of receptivity on economic growth, we verify that, in our
model, innovation as the introduction of new goods as old goods is the only engine of
long-run growth. To proceed, we follow the standard definition of an “economic growth
rate”: γ(t) ≡ (u(t + 1) − u(t))/u(t). By using (2), (11), (14), and (17), we obtain
u(t) = u˜(t)A(t)
1
σ−1 , where u˜(t) = (E(t)/w(t)) (1 + εσ−1N(t)/A(t))
1
σ−1 includes the wage-
measured expenditure, E(t)/w(t), and the fraction of new goods, N(t)/A(t). When Θ <
εσ−1/κ, the economy is caught in a trap. In a trapped economy, N(t) = ΘA(t), while
both E(t)/w(t) and A(t) are constant over time. The growth rate is, thus, equal to
γ(t) = 0. This implies that while generating inventions, any trapped economy cannot
achieve self-sustained long-run growth. Using Proposition 2, therefore, we may conclude
that having moderate receptivity to novelty ε is essential to self-sustained growth as well
as innovation.
Now combine Propositions 1 and 2 in order to obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Individual receptivity to novelty has a non-monotonic relationship with in-
novation and growth in the long run.
This theorem establishes the important result that receptivity to novelty is not always
good for innovation and growth; too strong or too weak receptivity hurts innovation and
growth at the aggregate level. This is clearly consistent with the recent empirical evidence
that we mentioned in the Introduction. Therefore, we believe that our theory provides
an economic explanation for the inverted-U relationship between individual propensities
for novelty and macroeconomic performance found in recent empirical analyses. Putting
it simply, the theory says, consumers’ receptivity to novelty encourages firms to invent
new goods but discourages them from introducing, via the market mechanism. A larger
number of goods are, then, newly invented in the market, whereby there is an added
incentive for firms to introduce new goods (into old goods), via the matching efficiency
effect. Receptivity, therefore, has an ambiguous effect on innovation and growth. The
explanation here is fully endogenous, based on incentives and markets.
Theorem 1 also suggests a role of governments in innovation to “fix” overly high or
overly low receptivity among individuals, and adjust it to a moderate level. In some
countries, policies unintentionally affect receptivity to novelty. For example, in the U.S.,
the authority of the Department of Health and Human Services to fund human embry-
onic stem-cell research had been limited by U.S. Presidential actions from 2001 to 2009.
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These limitations were removed by U.S. President Barack Obama in March 2009.27 The
Internet provides another example. Until 1995, the U.S. government restricted the use of
the Internet to non-commercial purposes. Although the market grew rapidly after dereg-
ulation, many market participants had been unwilling to accept the forthcoming policy
change when the removal of the restriction was on the table. Our result suggests that
the government can play a role in promoting innovation by avoiding excessively high or
low receptivity among individuals.
5 An Extension: Balanced Growth and Path Depen-
dence
In this section, we explore an extension of our baseline model. Our model features only
traps and cycles in dynamic equilibrium. Therefore, we allow for the model to have
balanced growth.
For that purpose, we add minimal elements to the process of innovation. Following
Anderlini et al. (2013), we introduce an exogenous growth factor, η(t) ≥ 0, into the
baseline model;28 the number of endogenous inventions, RN(t), together with the number
of exogenously produced inventions, η(t), determine the dynamics of new goods by N(t+
1) = RN(t) + η(t). For the sake of simplicity, we further assume η(t) = ηN(t), with
η ∈ [0, 1).29 When W n(t) = 0, thus, the new good N(t) evolves in the invention regime
due to
N(t+ 1) = ΘA(t) + ηN(t), (33)
which corresponds to (23). When W a(t) = 0, the free entry condition similar to (26) is
now
ρ(t+ 1) =
κβ
µ/(µ− 1)
E(t)
w(t)
− A(t)
N(t)
− ηεσ−1, (34)
which uses N(t + 1) = ηN(t) since RN(t) = 0. From (25) and (34), the old good A(t)
evolves due to
ρ(t+ 1) =
1
1 + β (µ− 1)
(
β (µ− 1)κL− A(t)
N(t)
− ηεσ−1
)
.30 (35)
Combining (33) and (35), we can derive the equilibrium dynamical system as:
n(t+ 1) =
{
ηn(t) + Θ ≡ ϕN(n(t)) for n(t) < εσ−1/κ
η(1+β(µ−1))n(t)
β(µ−1)+(β(µ−1)κL−ηεσ−1)n(t) ≡ ϕA(n(t)) for n(t) > εσ−1/κ
, (36)
27For details, see Executive Order 13505 of March 9, 2009, titled “Removing Barriers to Responsible
Scientific Research Involving Human Stem Cells.”
28Exogenous innovation is often assumed in research for a deeper understanding of, not the cause of
innovation but, the role of innovation in various phenomena; see, for instance, Lucas and Moll (2014) and
Benhabib et al. (2017). Given that our goal in the present paper is to investigate the cause of innovation,
our extended model still has endogenous innovation, RN (t), more in accordance with Anderlini et al.
(2013), who consider both endogenous and exogenous components in the innovation process.
29If η > 1, the new good, N(t), autonomously expands without the help of endogenous invention.
Given the focus of our paper, we should restrict the exogenous growth factor to be lower than 1; η < 1.
30To ensure feasibility, such that ρ(t + 1) ∈ (0, 1) for any n(t) in the introduction regime, it would
suffice to assume β (µ− 1)κL− ((β (µ− 1) + κ/εσ−1 + 1) < ηεσ−1 < β (µ− 1)κL.
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Figure 4b: Global Trap with ߝ ב (ߝି, ߝା)
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which uses (4).31 Function ϕN is linear and ϕA is concave, and both are increasing in
n(t), each of which has a unique fixed point for n(t) > 0, labelled n∗ and n∗∗, respectively.
Proposition 1 still holds, but locally; the conditions also change slightly. (A proof
requires a tedious sequence of similar calculations, which is omitted here.)32 Suppose
L >
√
1− η
κ
(
1 +
1
β(µ− 1)κ
)
1
β(µ− 1) ≡ L
′
0.
Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the extended model with the coexistence of endogenous and exogenous
inventions, if the infinitely lived consumer’s receptivity to novelty ε is sufficiently low
or high, such that ε /∈ [ε′−, ε′+],33 there is a locally stable equilibrium trap, n∗. Once the
economy falls into the invention regime, it is trapped and converging to the situation, n∗,
in which invention occurs, but there is no innovation in the long run.
Concerning the introduction regime, there are two possibilities. First, if n∗∗ exists
outside the introduction regime, the equilibrium behavior of the economy is quite similar
to that in Proposition 2. That is, the economy may achieve innovation perpetually but
cyclically, as shown in Figure 4a. Otherwise, it may be fatally caught in the global trap,
as shown in Figure 4b. Second, if n∗∗ is included in the introduction regime, it may work
as a globally stable steady state, as shown in Figure 4c. On that point, the number of new
goods, N(t), and that of old goods, A(t), grow at the same rate. Therefore, in this case,
31We also use A(t+ 1) = A(t) for n(t) < εσ−1/κ and N(t+ 1) = ηN(t) for n(t) > εσ−1/κ. In order to
ensure n(t+1) > 0 for any n(t) > εσ−1/κ, we impose an upper bound of . ε < [(κ/η)β (µ− 1)L]1/(σ−1).
32A formal proof is available upon request from the authors.
33Note that ε′− and ε
′
+ are solutions to the quadratic equation in ε, given by n
∗ = εσ−1/κ, with
n∗ = Θ/(1− η). They are quite similar to ε− and ε+ in Lemma 4.
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Figure 4c: Balanced Growth with ߝ א (ߝି, ߝା)
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Figure 5: Path Dependency with ߝ ב (ߝି, ߝା)
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any path starting from any initial state converges to point n∗∗ that gives the economy
balanced growth, as in the standard growth model. It is worth mentioning that in either
case, the economy achieves perpetual innovation and growth if ε ∈ [ε′−, ε′+], corresponding
to Figures 4a and 4c. Therefore, Proposition 2 will be revised in this extended model,
without any essential change.
Proposition 4 In the extended model with the coexistence of endogenous and exogenous
inventions, if the infinitely lived consumer’s receptivity to novelty ε is moderate, such that
ε ∈ [ε′−, ε′+], the economy necessarily avoids traps and achieves perpetual innovation. The
growth path is either cyclical or balanced.34
Figure 5 depicts another interesting case that emerges from the present extension.
There are two locally stable steady states; whether the economy converges to a balanced
growth path or invention trap depends on the initial condition. There is so-called path
dependence, implying that the economy may suffer from a lock-in by virtue of historical
events (e.g., Arthur 1989).
6 Concluding Remarks
In the present study, we explored the relationship between individual receptivity to nov-
elty and innovation at the aggregate level. We first used data from the World Values
Survey and the World Intellectual Property Organization to show that the relationship
may be more complex than is naturally considered. We showed that, unconditionally,
innovation tends to be higher at the medium level of receptivity but lower at the two
34It is easy (but tedious) to derive a condition under which the growth path is balanced. A formal
proof is available upon request from the authors.
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ends of the receptivity distribution. We offered a new theory that provides a useful basis
for interpreting such a complex relationship between receptivity and innovation. In do-
ing this, we developed a new R&D-based growth model, in which (i) innovation consists
of two separate creative activities that both require investments, i.e., the invention of
new goods and their introduction to old goods, and (ii) the infinitely-lived representative
consumer has different preferences to new and old goods.
The endogenous growth literature has, thus far, emphasized the importance of endoge-
nous innovation as an engine of long-run growth (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman
1991, Aghion and Howitt 1992). The existing models were basically designed to identify
the role of innovation through its ultimate contribution to the long-run growth rate, but
neither explicitly through its internal process of interacting with different stages in the
growth process nor its relation to the receptivity to novelty as a cultural preference. In
the model that we developed, invention and introduction are treated as discrete (and
costly) activities that interact with each other to achieve innovation and govern the evo-
lution of an economy. In our model, we clearly distinguished the invention of a new good
from its introduction, by considering a new preference parameter. Using the model, we
then examined the role of receptivity to novelty in creating self-sustained innovation and
endogenous growth in several forms such as innovation cycles, balanced growth, and his-
tory dependence. The model was designed to be simple and tractable, and, yet, capable
of drawing new insights into the role of innovation in economic growth and providing a
theory supported by the new fact that we documented in the Introduction.
Needless to say, the present study offers only a glance at how receptivity to novelty
affects innovation-driven growth, when we earnestly delve into the details of the complex
process of innovation. Our proposed model does not contain all of the aspects of receptiv-
ity/aversion to novelty or innovation. It is, for example, considered exogenous, but it may
change over time, in line with consumer behavior. Although the formulation of matching
takes a very simple form, we could work with a more general setting, such as a Cobb-
Douglas matching function. These restrictions help make analysis sufficiently tractable,
but they also make the equilibrium unrealistic. Most importantly, in the present model,
there is no equilibrium where invention and introduction coexist; in reality, however, the
two components of innovation often take place concurrently. For future research, one can
rectify this problem by assuming strictly concave, rather than linear, technologies. Oth-
erwise, allowing for consumers’ learning activities with regard to novel products would
also work sufficiently. Nevertheless, given its simplicity, we believe that our model has an
advantage over such extended models: the equilibrium dynamic system is quite simple
and, therefore, all analyses can be undertaken analytically to demonstrate two interesting
dynamic phenomena, that is, equilibrium traps and innovation cycles.
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Appendix A: Regression Analysis
In Figure 1 in the Introduction, we observed an unconditional, hump-shaped relation-
ship between receptivity and innovation. To statistically verify it, this appendix presents
a more formal regression analysis.
Data sources We use data the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to
obtain patent applications for various countries. To measure receptivity, we use data from
the World Values Survey (WVS). In particular, we use the survey question E046 which
asks respondents to give a score to the statement “Ideas stood test of time better vs
New ideas better.” The score ranges from 1 (“Ideas that stood test of time are generally
best”) to 10 (“New ideas are generally better than old ones”).
We also use WVS to construct two measures of religiosity. Specifically, we use the
survey questions F034 and F050. F034 asks whether the respondent is a religious person
(the survey question is: “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say
you are ...” with possible answers 1 (“A religious person”), 2 (“Not a religious person”),
and 3 (“A convinced atheist”).) F050 asks whether the respondent believes in god (the
survey question is: “Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? ... God” with
possible answers 0 (“No”) and 1 (“Yes”).)
As for other control variables, we obtain data for GDP and population from the World
Bank and data for the net inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage of
GDP from the World Development Index (WDI); the index of patent rights comes from
Park (2008); data for years of tertiary schooling come from Barro and Lee (2013); we
also use WVS data to construct the two religiosity measures (share of religious people
and share of people believing in God).
Variable definitions Using the patent applications data from WIPO and population
data from the World Bank, we compute the innovation variable as log (Average patent
applications over 2010-2014c/Average population in million over 2010-2014c).
To compute the receptivity measure, Receptivityc, we start with the full individual-
level sample from WVS (1981-2014). We drop observations with missing values in E046;
the resulting sample covers the period 1989-2002. We then collapse the sample into
country-level means to obtain Receptivityc.
Other control variables in the regression analysis are also country-level means. More
specifically, the index of patent rights is the average over 1960-1990; population, GDP
per capita, and FDI (as % of GDP) are the averages over 1960-1990; years of tertiary
schooling are the average over 1960-1990; the religiosity measures (share of religious
people and share of people believing in God) are the averages over 1981-2002.
The main reason of creating some “time lags” between the key outcome variable, the
key independent variable, and other control variables is to address some of the endogeneity
and reverse causality concerns.35
Sample characteristics Based on the above variable definitions, we obtain a sam-
ple with 52 observations (with non-missing Innovationc and Receptivityc), 29 (with
non-missing values in all other control variables). Note that there are two outliers in
Receptivityc (Bangladesh and Colombia): Their values are 8.38 and 8.21 respectively
35Note that while the raw data have a panel structure, we may not be able to come up with a panel
directly to estimate a panel regression because many variables are not contemporaneous.
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whereas the maximum value of the remaining countries is about 6.46 (see Table 1 for the
summary statistics of the sample). In the above empirical analysis, we drop these two
outliers.
Regression results We estimate the following quadratic regression to identify whether,
after controlling for several country-level characteristics, there is still a non-linear rela-
tionship between receptivity and innovation:
Innovationc = α + β1Receptivityc + β2(Receptivityc)
2 + δXc + εc. (37)
In this regression, c indexes a country, Innovationc and Receptivityc are the innovation
and receptivity measures. Xc is a vector of other country-level control variables, including
log GDP per capita, log Population, intellectual property protection, years of tertiary
schooling, net inflow of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, religiosity;
these control variables are also used in Benabou et al. (2016). Finally, εc is the error
term.
Table 2 shows the regression results of (37). In Column (1), we regress Innovationc
on Receptivityc and its square term only. The coefficient of Receptivity is positive and
that of the square term is negative; both coefficients are statistically significant, sug-
gesting that, unconditionally, there is a non-linear (inverted-U) relationship between the
two variables. In Column (2), we control for the country-level characteristics except the
religiosity variables in the regression. Finally, Benabou et al. (2016) find that innovation
is negatively related people’s religiosity; in Columns (3) and (4), we further control for
the share of religious people and the share of people believing in God. In these other
regressions, we still obtain similar results. Besides, the signs of the coefficients of these
control variables are in general consistent with those reported in Benabou et al. (2016).
Overall, this analysis shows that, after controlling for some country-level characteristics,
we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between Innovationc and Receptivityc. The
regression results imply that Innovationc reaches the maximum when Receptivityc is
roughly around 4.2 to 4.6. Certainly, the results reported in Table 2 only imply associa-
tions rather than causality. Nevertheless, these results provide the motivation for us to
study the model developed in the present paper.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean S.D. Min. 1st quart. Median 3rd quart. Max.
Innovationc 50 3.667 2.030 -1.553 2.698 3.696 5.038 7.996
Receptivityc 50 5.109 0.605 3.767 4.607 5.209 5.510 6.455
GDP per capita (log) 29 8.842 1.410 5.677 8.255 8.708 10.091 10.962
Population (log) 29 3.620 1.533 1.223 2.318 3.568 4.392 7.208
Index of patent rights 29 2.112 0.853 0.590 1.380 2.120 2.750 4.140
Years of tertiary schooling 29 17.572 11.236 0.586 9.700 16.800 21.871 52.914
FDI (as % of GDP) 29 0.607 0.609 -0.058 0.179 0.471 0.930 2.341
% religious people 29 0.659 0.216 0.098 0.528 0.746 0.821 0.939
% people believing in God 27 0.855 0.152 0.514 0.793 0.927 0.975 0.995
29
Table 2: Receptivity and innovation: Regression analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Receptivityc 12.773** 11.661* 14.341*** 11.748**
(6.169) (6.744) (5.276) (5.344)
(Receptivityc)
2 -1.400** -1.389** -1.554*** -1.310**
(0.614) (0.643) (0.522) (0.522)
GDP per capita (log) 0.547* 0.526** 0.509**
(0.286) (0.227) (0.249)
Population (log) 0.098 0.242** 0.219*
(0.154) (0.121) (0.125)
Index of patent rights 0.889*** 0.596** 0.522**
(0.320) (0.251) (0.213)
Years of tertiary schooling -0.014 0.001 0.005
(0.028) (0.018) (0.018)
FDI (as % of GDP) -0.018 -0.085 0.195
(0.280) (0.246) (0.269)
% religious people -4.049***
(0.893)
% people believing in God -5.716***
(1.723)
Constant -24.545 -25.298 -32.151*** -23.054*
(15.353) (17.097) (12.327) (12.310)
Observations 50 29 29 27
R2 0.279 0.769 0.853 0.872
Note: The dependent variable is Patent applications per million capita
(log). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗: signifi-
cance at 10% level; ∗∗: significance at 5% level; ∗ ∗ ∗: significance at
1% level.
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